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Establishing the Standard for a Physician's Patient
Diagnosis Using Scientific Evidence: Dealing with the
Split of Authority Amongst the Circuit Courts of Appeal
Jack E. Karns •
Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the
other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific
project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be
1
shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance.

I. INTRODUCTION

In any trial where an expert's opinion or other scientific evidence is
relied upon to establish causation, serious questions are raised as to the
standard that should be applied by the court when deciding questions of
admissibility. 2 In no area is this problem more acute than in the healthcare field where patients afflicted with various and sundry maladies attempt to prove that a particular company is responsible, and they want to
do so by the introduction of scientific evidence and expert testimony,
especially that of physicians. 3 The federal courts have not been a model
of clarity with regard to this issue, and there now exists a singular split
among the federal circuits that may have to be resolved by the Supreme
Court. 4

* Copyright © 2000 by Jack E. Karns, Professor of Business Law, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC. S.J.D. (Candidate) (Health Law and Policy), 2001, Loyola University Chicago;
LL.M. (Taxation), 1992, Georgetown University; J.D., 1981, Tulane University; M.P.A., M.S.,
1974, B.A., 1973, Syracuse University.
I. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,597 (1993).
2. This issue has been garnering considerable coverage recently in the press. See, e.g., John
R. Henderson eta!., How "Reliable" Should a Physician's Diagnosis Be?, NAT'L. L.J., May 29,
2000, at Bl8; June D. Bell, Gauging an Expert's Expertise, NAT'L. L.J., July 24, 2000, at AlO (covering Utah state cases); and William C. Smith, No Escape from Science, A.B.A. J., August 2000, at
60.
3. In the American Bar Association Journal article, the author stated, "Scientific and technical issues have infiltrated nearly every comer of legal practice. Lawyers who thought they might
avoid the esoteric rigors of science and technology simply by sidestepping a few fields like medical
malpractice and patent law have come in for a rude awakening." Smith, supra note 2, at 60.
4. See infra Sections III, IV, and V.
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Although the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. case provides the starting point for evaluating this issue, subsequent
case law and application thereof has diverged from the general gatekeeping function originally envisioned by this precedent. 6 Through its gatekeeping function, Daubert intended that trial courts test the reliability
and relevance of the scientific evidence, not that it be put to the scrutiny
by members of the appropriate professional community.7 However, with
the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE or the "Rules"), the
Daubert approach was emboldened as the Rules required that a certain
flexibility be maintained with regard to the admission of all evidence. 8
The theory underlying this approach was that the trier of fact should not
be deprived of relevant evidence, was capable of discerning levels of
relevancy vis a vis causation, and finally, that opponents could rely on
cross-examination to expose weaknesses in any evidence, scientific or
otherwise. 9
5

5. 509 U.S. at 579.
6. The Daubert Court utilized Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in conjunction with its concept
of the "gatekeeping" function at the trial court level to explain the role of judges in rendering decisions regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence. Essentially, the Court found that any evidence or testimony that assisted the trier of fact in rendering a decision or understanding a fact at
issue should be admitted pursuant to the gatekeeping function. Most importantly, the Court distinguished this role by pointing to the issue of relevancy and its criticality in the decision process. ld. at
591.
7. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. The Court clarified its position:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at
the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. We are confident that federal
judges possess the capacity to undertake this review. Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.
!d. (footnotes omitted).
8. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence the controlling case precedent regarding expert opinion and scientific evidence was Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923).
In accordance with the foregoing, the Daubert Court responded, "Because we hold that
Frye has been superseded and base the discussion that follows on the content of the congressionally
enacted Federal Rules of Evidence, we do not address petitioners' argument that application of the
Frye rule in this diversity case, as the application of a judge-made rule affecting substantive rights,
would violate the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.6 (citation omitted). "That the Frye test was displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence does not mean, however,
that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor
is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial
judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but reliable."
!d. at 589.
9. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. The Court was most adamant in its confidence regarding the use of cross-examination to weed out weak evidence:
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on
the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of
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In recent cases, this flexibility approach was tested by proponents
who demanded that a physician's differential diagnosis be supported by
scientific studies and peer reviews, as is customary in the scientific
community. The Third and Fourth Circuits, and more recently the Utah
Supreme Court, chose to hold that such studies are not required for admissibility purposes under the FRE or Daubert. 10 The contra position
was taken by the Fifth Circuit, which now requires hard scientific backup
before a physician's differential diagnosis can be admitted. 11 The conflict
presented here is the subject of this article.
Following a discussion of the Daubert case and its attendant requirements, the various Circuit cases will be discussed as to the efficacy
of both approaches. 12 Two Utah Supreme Court cases will receive particular attention and prominence as they are the first to be promulgated
by the highest court of any state on this issue. 13 Finally, the author will
offer comments and rationale supporting the more flexible approach regarding admissibility of physician diagnoses that is supported by the majority of state and federal courts and which stands opposed presently only
by the Fifth Circuit. 14

II. THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION-THE DAUBERT CASE
15

the Supreme Court accepted, on certiorari, an appeal
from a Ninth Circuit case 16 regarding the question of how reliable a physician's diagnosis had to be in order to escape any negligence claims. 17
Specifically, as Justice Blackmun put it in his opinion, the Court was
called upon to determine the standard that would be used for "admitting
expert scientific testimony in a federal trial." 18 In this case, the petitionIn Daubert

evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to
conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a
judgment, and likewise to grant summary judgment. ... These conventional devices,
rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising 'general acceptance' test, are
the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of
Rule 702.
/d. at 596 (footnotes, citations, and commentary omitted).
10. Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999); Westberry v. Gislaved
Gummi A.B., 178 F. 3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999); State v. Kelley, I P.3d 546 (Utah 2000); State v. Adams,
5 P.3d 642 (Utah 2000).
II. Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) cert. denied 526 U.S.
1064; Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999).
12. See infra Sections III and IV.
13. See infra Section V.
14. See infra Section VI.
15. 509 U.S. at 579.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. /d. at 582.
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ers, Jason Daubert and Eric Sure, were minor children who had been
19
born with serious birth defects. The petitioners filed suit in California
state court alleging that the birth defects had been caused by the mother's
ingestion of Benedictin, a prescription drug marketed by the defendant
and prescribed to the plaintiff for nausea. 20 Prior to any argument, the
case was removed to federal court on diversity grounds. 21 The district
court granted Merrell Dow's motion for summary judgment, holding that
the scientific evidence upon which the plaintiff relied was not sufficiently established in order to have any sort of general acceptance in the
medical field. 22 The district court later concluded that Daubert had not
met the standard set forth in United States v. Killgus. 23
Benedictin had been tested thoroughly, and there was a vast body of
epidemiological data which tended to support Merrell Dow's arguments. 24 Another important factor raised by the district court was the fact
that the live animal studies on which the petitioners relied could not be
reasonably used by a jury in terms of deciding the issue of causation. 25
Also, with regard to the mountain of published studies that had been
submitted and which had found no causal connection between the drug
and any birth defect, the court ruled that these were not admissible since
they had neither been published nor subjected to any sort of outside peer
.
26
revrew.
Following extensive discovery, Merrell Dow filed for summary
judgment based on the contention that Benedictin did not cause birth defects in humans and that the plaintiff could not produce any scientific
27
evidence that would be admissible at trial. In what became the battle of
the expert witnesses, Merrell Dow put Steven Lamm, a physician epidemiologist, on the stand to testify about a number of published articles
that essentially found that Benedictin was not a substance capable of creating any type of malformations in fetuses. 28 Based upon his extensive
review of the literature and his professional opinion, Dr. Lamm concluded that Benedictin was not a cause of human birth defects, even if
taken during the first trimester of pregnancy. 29

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
Seeid.
See id.
See id. at 583.
See id.
Seeid.
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584.
Seeid.
See id. at 582.
See id.
See id.
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The Court was particularly taken with the fact that the briefs that had
been filed in the case by both parties did not include the general types of
information, statutory language, or case law that was customarily submitted. 30 The briefs dealt with definitions of "scientific knowledge, scientific
method, scientific validity and peer review-in short, matters far from
the expertise of judges." 31 Clearly, the Court was not as comfortable with
these briefs as it would have been had they included the traditional statutory and case precedent material. This made the Court's decision making
process more difficult because since it had to base its decision on the
"expert" observations provided in the briefs and the conflicting testimony provided by the expert witnesses. 32
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and stated
that any sort of medical or expert opinion had to be based on a scientific
technique that was "generally accepted as reliable within the relevant
scientific community." 33 The appellate court stated that the expert opinions that had been offered diverged significantly from recognized authorities in the field and could not be "generally accepted as a reliable
technique" so as to meet the admissibility standards. 34 The Ninth Circuit
noted that other circuits refused to admit epidemiological studies that had
not been published or subjected to peer review. Since the entire scientific
community had no opportunity to view the material and offer its opinion,
the strictures of the Federal Rules of Evidence were not met. 35 The Supreme Court subsequently concurred by noting that the issue of admissibility for scientific data rested on the reanalysis by the scientific community, thereby upholding its veracity relative to the issue of causation?6
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the petitioners had not satisfied their
causation burden at trial, and that they had laid an insufficient basis for
the admission of their expert testimony that Benedictin was the cause of
their children's deformities. 37 The United States Supreme Court recognized the division among the Circuits and granted certiorari to resolve
the conflict. 38
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing the Frye v.
United States 39 case and stating that the "general acceptance" test that
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 599.
!d. at 599.
See id.
/d. at 584.
/d.
See id.
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-98.
See id. at 585.
See id.
See id.
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was the result of Frye had become the accepted standard regarding admissibility of "novel scientific evidence at trial." 40 The Court observed
that the rule had been standing for seven decades and that it was followed by the Ninth Circuit. 41 The key language of the rule is that which
refers to the deduction having to be made sufficiently so as to gain general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 42 This decision
became the long accepted rule for admissibility of scientific evidence,
even though the Frye opinion had its origin in a brief 1923 decision
which contained no legal citations. 43
Daubert argued that the Frye test, whatever that test might be, was
44
superseded when the FRE were adopted. The Supreme Court agreed
with this argument and began with an analysis of Rule 402 which provides the baseline for any analysis for the admissibility of relevant evidence.45 Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible, but this must
be read in concert with Rule 401 which provides that evidence becomes
relevant whenever it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 46 Forgetting for
a moment about the difficulties in deciding whether or not scientific evidence is relevant or admissible, it is granted that the FRE went to great
lengths to incorporate as much admissible evidence as possible.
Other Federal Rules of Evidence that are of importance in this particular case include Rule 702 which has to do with expert testimony and
which provides: "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact and issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise."47 It should be noted that the term "general acceptance" is not necessarily included in this particular rule and that there is
no connection which ties rules 401 and 402 together relative to the types
of evidence which have to be available in order to be admissible to prove
causation. Consequently, given the drafting of the FRE and the decision
in the Frye case, the Supreme Court concluded that a rigid construction
of the "general acceptance" requirement would be contradictory to the
liberal tendencies of the FRE to relax the less stringent requirements on
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
See id. at 585-86.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 587.
See id.
!d. at 587.
/d. at 588.
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opinion testimony .48 At the time Frye was decided, it was the exclusive
test for admitting scientific testimony and was an "austere standard"
when compared with the more current FRE. 49
Just as the Court accepted the FREas superseding the Frye general
acceptance test, it also stated that there were limitations on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence if the trial judge was in any way
not able to screen the evidence or was precluded from insuring that the
evidence was reliable. 50 Obviously, the connection here is with Rule 702
and the role that the expert plays in validating any type of scientific study
for the court and jury to use in making its determination. As the Court
pointed out, the word "scientific" engenders in the public a feeling that
there have been procedures of some type acceptable in the world of science that, although the public does not understand them, legitimize the
study. 51
The purpose of expert testimony is to assist the trier of fact to reach a
conclusion, and, in the Daubert case, that conclusion was related to the
key issue of causation. It appears that two of the things the court may
look to are the scientific methodology used in studies (i.e., can a theory
or technique be tested, and has empirical testing been applied to the data
involved?) and the peer review and publication aspect that results from
the aforementioned studies. 52 But, as the Daubert Court said, this is not
the "sine qua non of admissibility" 53 since it does not necessarily establish the reliability of the scientific evidence in question. 54 Many propositions have been put forward in trial without the proper testing only to
find out that some component of science was overlooked or that the scientist involved was too enthusiastic as to his or her results. This results in
substantive laws in methodology, and the court must be ever mindful of
the fact that when this occurs it is the job of the judge to ensure that this
type of evidence is excluded. 55
The Court was particularly concerned about the pessimism of
Merrell Dow regarding the ability of the jury and the judge, in general,
through cross-examination and careful examination of the evidence, to
render an appropriate result. 56 Although scientific conclusions may be
subject to a perpetual revision, law has to be resolved finally and it must
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
See id. at 589.
See id.
See id. at 590.
See id. at 593.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
See id.
See id. at 595.
See id. at 595-96.
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be resolved quickly. In other words, there is no such thing as the legal
57
scientific process. The Court also noted that the primary role for the
judge is the gatekeeping role-to ensure that the aforementioned rules of
evidence and scientific validity are not violated when evidence is admitted into trial and that the evidence is submitted to a vigorous crossexamination to insure that the jury is provided a good look at both sides
of the case. 58 A judge can always exclude evidence under FRE 403 if he
or she believes that the probative value is substantially outweighed by
59
the unfair prejudice that it would create by misleading the jury. Finally,
the Court stated that the "general acceptance" test is not necessarily a
precondition to admissibility of evidence in the FRE and that there are
other foundations based on scientific principles that will satisfy these
demands. 60 Since the district court and Ninth Circuit focused on the general acceptance test as enunciated in Frye, the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case for further pro.
61
ceed mgs.
Ill. THE FIFfH CIRCUIT

In 1998 and 1999, four cases were decided by various United States
courts of appeal which have now created a split among the circuits on the
62
causation factor when expert testimony is involved. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided the following two cases.
A. Black v. Food Lion, Inc.
In Black v. Food Lion, lnc., 63 Maxine Black was shopping at a Food
Lion store in Grand Prairie, Texas when she slipped and fell on the residue of a broken mayonnaise jar that had been dropped by a stock boy.
Although the stock boy cleaned up the contents of the spill with paper
towels and the cleanup was approved by the store manager, Ms. Black
64
fell on the spot and filed this action. The case was removed to federal
court by the defendant. The plaintiff recovered nearly $300,000 in damages because she was able to establish a diagnosis of fibromyalgia syn-

57. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
58. See id. at 589 n.7, 597, 599.
59. See id. at 595.
60. See /d. at 589, 597.
61. See id. at 598.
62. See Black, 171 F.3d at 308; Moore, 151 F.3d at 269; Heller, 167 F.3d at 146; Westberry,
178 F. 3d at 257.
63. 171 F.3d at 309.
64. See id.
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drome. 65 The court described it as an elusive but debilitating affliction.
A large part of Ms. Black's case was de£endent upon the expert witness
and evidence that she put on the stand. 6 The Fifth Circuit reversed the
award, concluding that Ms. Black had not adequately established her
case by the production of reliable scientific expert evidence or witnesses.67
Some background is necessary to understand the test which was used
by the Fifth Circuit in reaching this particular decision. While in the
store, Ms. Black slipped on the mayonnaise film on the floor while es68
corting her daughter to the restroom. At that time, she complained of
pains in her lower back and arm, a headache, and dizziness. 69 The injury
was immediately reported to the Food Lion management, and Ms. Black
sought medical attention. 70 Ms. Black's physician was Dr. James Pollifrone, who conducted tests and physical therapy but was unable to identify any physical basis for Ms. Black's continued complaints of pain. 71
He prescribed a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) test, an EMG, and
a battery of other tests that he would do for any patient for whom a diagnosis was difficult to reach. 72 On May 11, 1994, he referred Ms. Black to
Dr. Mary Reyna, a physician certified by the American Board of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation and by the American Board of Pain
Medicine, and holding a specialty in persistent and chronic pain treatment.73
After a short time Dr. Reyna diagnosed Ms. Black with fibromyalgia
syndrome. 74 This syndrome is characterized by generalized pain, poor
sleep, an inability to concentrate, and chronic fatigue. Although it is most
common in women between the ages of 30 and 40 and is associated generally with hormonal problems, Dr. Reyna's hypothesis was that the fall
caused the physical trauma that resulted in hormonal changes which precipitated Ms. Black's condition.75
After the case was removed to federal court, the court conducted a
bench trial. 76 Food Lion, of course, argued that it was not negligent and

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See Black, 171 F.3d at 309.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Black,171 F.3d at 309.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id ..
Seeid.

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

10

[Volume 15

that the action it had taken had been reasonable relative to the danger
presented and to the duty and breach of said duty, which had occurred
with the spilling and breaking of the mayonnaise jar in the store's aisle. 77
Food Lion, more importantly, argued that the scientific evidence which
Ms. Black offered was insufficient to support her contention that she suffered from this unusual disease. In a nutshell, Food Lion's defense "was
the contention that Dr. Reyna's testimony could not causally link the fall
at Food Lion with Black's present medical condition with any degree of
medical certainty."78 The trial court rejected Food Lion's arguments and
did allow Dr. Reyna to testify over its objections, ultimately awarding
79
judgment to Ms. Black.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the factual findings for clear error and
conclusions of law. The court pointed out that Food Lion did not engage
in an extensive defense regarding the issue of negligence since it felt that
its conduct had risen to the level of an adequate negligence defense. 80
The real contention focused on the extent of Ms. Black's damages regarding the relationship of her fall to the onset of fibromyalgia. 81
The court pointed out that, under Texas law, Ms. Black's burden of
proof required her to prove that, pursuant to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty based on medical probability and scientifically reliable
evidence, the fall at Food Lion directly caused her claimed injury. 82 All
she presented at trial was Dr. Reyna's testimony, which resulted from the
several weeks of treatment before the trial began. 83 The magistrate judge
allowed Dr. Reyna to testify as an expert witness notwithstanding Food
Lion's challenge pursuant to Rule 702 and, most importantly, pursuant to
Daubert. 84 Although the majority did not specifically tie its decision to
the scientific reliability standard set out in Daubert, it did make some interesting remarks which bear on understanding this ruling.
The judge stated that "the court looks to the trial testimony presented
by Dr. Reyna as well as that of other medical experts whose testimony
was presented by deposition." 85 Despite the elusiveness which appeared
in an absolute determination of causality via testimony of the specialists
in the field, their conflicting testimony had to be recognized because they
all followed proper protocol in rendering an opinion in terms of reason77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See Black,171 F. 3d at 309.
/d.
See id. at 309-310.
See id. at 310.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 309.
See id. at 310.
/d.
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able medical probability. 86 It does appear that Dr. Reyna followed this
particular protocol in basing her presentation of testimony in court on
this evidence. 87
The Black court was particularly taken that the district court did not
even mention the Daubert case. This raised serious reservations regarding the intellectual rigor that had been used to determine Ms. Black's
medical condition. 88 Because of this, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
magistrate judge had abused his discretion in admitting Dr. Reyna's testimony.89 To justify this conclusion, the court held that experts had recognized that there is an insufficient amount of evidence to establish that a
particular trauma causes fibromyalgia. 90 The appellate court also listed
the Daubert factors that should be used in order to establish scientific validity or reliability when judging the validity of any expert's testimony. 91
The court's conclusion was that Dr. Reyna's theory did not pass
muster with regard to meeting these tests. More to the point, it stated that
Dr. Reyna's conclusion was more conjecture than science and was not
deduced from "scientifically validated information."92 Considerable time
was spent noting that the scientific literature states that Dr. Reyna's theory has not gained acceptance in the medical profession. Resident experts throughout the field conclude that the ultimate cause of fibromyalgia cannot be known and that it is only an educated estimate that can be
made by a physician based on the patient's history. To quote the Fifth
Circuit, "[m]ere conjecture does not satisfy the standard for general acceptance, except to demonstrate general acceptance of a proposition contrary to Dr. Reyna's. Finally, Dr. Reyna's theory of causation, which has
been verified or generally accepted, also has no known potential rate of
error." 93
Since the exact causes of fibromyalgia are not known, there can be
no way to prove in a court of law what scientific evidence would be sufficient to show causation of this disease by any particular type of traumatic action such as that which occurred in this particular case. The court
negated Dr. Reyna's testimony and held that Food Lion was not liable
for any medical expenses, lost wages, pain, or suffering that were attributable to her diagnosis of fibromyalgia by the physician. She could only
86. See Black, 171 F. 3d at 310.
87. See id. at 310-12. See, e.g., Moore, 151 F.3d at 269 and Kuhmo Tire Company, Ltd. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
88. See Black, 171 F. 3d at 312.
89. Seeid. at312-14.
90. See id. at 312.
91. See id. at 311. See also Kuhmo Tire Company, Ltd., 526 U.S. at 137.
92. /d.Black,I7IF.3dat313.
93. /d.
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be compensated for expenses that occurred as a direct result of the slip
94
and fall relative to the mayonnaise residue on the floor.
B. Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc.

Another important case decided in the Fifth Circuit in 1999 was
Moore v. Ashland, 95 which was essentially a toxic tort action filed against
a chemical manufacturer. In this particular case, the key issue was
whether the court abused its discretion by excluding the opinion of a particular physician. The doctor would have testified as to the causal relationship between the plaintiff's exposure to the industrial chemicals and
96
his pulmonary illness. The court did not find any abuse of discretion
97
and affirmed the lower court's decision.
Bob Moore worked for Consolidated Freightways, a company which
contracted freight deliveries for a variety of companies. On the morning
of April 23, 1990, Moore delivered several containers of chemicals that
had been manufactured by Dow Coming Corporation to the Ashland
98
Chemical, Inc. terminal in Houston. When he opened the back door of
the trailer, a pungent chemical smell caused him to suspect that one of
99
the containers had started to leak. The Ashland Chemical Manager,
Bart Graves, along with Moore, identified the two leaking containers and
removed them from the trailer as soon as possible. Graves contacted
Dow and requested instructions as to how the cleanup should proceed as
well as a copy of the material safety data sheet (MSDS) for spilled
100
chemicals. The MSDS for these particular containers showed exactly
what was in them along with the health hazards associated with their
contents. 101 The MSDS noted that Toluene was the most hazardous of the
ingredients contained in the drums and warned that depending upon exposure to fumes, various organs such as lungs could be seriously damaged.102
In accordance with the cleanup instructions, Moore and Graves put
the leaking containers into larger salvage drums. Then Moore and another Consolidated Freightways employee placed absorbent material on
the spilled chemicals inside the Freightways trailer and swept them up.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. at 314-15.
Moore, 151 F.3d at 269.
See id. at 271.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 272.
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This cleanup period exposed the two men to the pungent fumes for ap103
proximately forty-five minutes to an hour.
Following the cleanup,
Moore went back to the Consolidated terminal from which he had begun
his travel. At trial, he testified that about an hour after finishing the
cleanup he began to feel symptoms of dizziness, watery eyes, and diffi104
culty breathing. Even though Moore was experiencing these physical
difficulties, he was able to deliver one more trailer as requested by his
supervisor. At the end of his final delivery, Moore returned to the terminal and told his supervisor that he was sick. The supervisor sent Moore to
the company doctor, and the next day Moore went to see his family phystctan.105
Following two to three weeks of treatment by his family physician,
Moore was placed under the care of a pulmonary specialist, Dr. Simi. Dr.
Simi released Moore to return to work on June 11, 1990, but after working several days, Moore terminated his employment due to difficulty
breathing. 106 During the summer of 1990, on three separate occasions, he
consulted Dr. Daniel E. Jenkins, another pulmonary specialist, and Dr.
Jenkins diagnosed his condition as a "Reactive Airways Disfunction
Syndrome" (RADS). This is an asthmatic type condition. 107 In November
1990, Moore sought out the advice of another pulmonary specialist, Dr.
B. Antonio Alverez, who became his primary treating physician and who
also confirmed Dr. Jenkins's diagnosis and treated Moore for RADS. 108
Moore told his physicians that he was a smoker, that he had consumed
approximately one pack of cigarettes a day for approximately twenty
years, and that he was smoking at the time of the trial. He further reported that on April 23, 1990, when he was exposed to the Dow chemical, he had just returned to work following an absence from work with
pneumonia. The evidence provided by Moore's childhood treating physi109
cian established that Moore had a related history of childhood asthma.
Moore and his wife filed suit against Ashland Chemical, Inc. and
others based on the grounds that Ashland was negligent in insisting that
Moore expose himself to the vapors that had been created by the spillage
of the leaking drums. To be more specific, Moore argued that Ashland's
employee, Bart Graves, did not have the authority to enlist Moore's support in cleaning up the spillage problem and should have permitted
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Moore to return to Consolidated's terminal or had other Ashland employees clean up the spill. no Finally, Moore argued that Graves did not
permit him to use a respirator during the cleanup and that this contributed
to the gravity of his physical problem. Following removal to federal
111
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the case moved toward trial.
After extensive motion arguments regarding whether or not expert
physicians should be permitted to testify, the case proceeded to trial before a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the district court entered a take
nothing judgment against Moore. Moore then appealed the decision to
the Fifth Circuit, which concluded that the district court had made an error in not allowing Dr. Jenkins, one of Moore's expert witnesses, to give
112
an opinion regarding the cause of Moore's illness. The divided Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a
new trial. 113 An en bane rehearing was granted to clarify the standards
that the district court should have applied in determining whether to ad.
.
Jl4
Illlt expert testimony.
In this particular appeal, the Circuit focused on the trial court's refusal to permit Dr. Daniel Jenkins to give an opinion on the cause of
Moore's illness. It is necessary to understand some additional factual and
procedural information and background in order to completely appreciate
the arguments of both parties in this particular case. Moore wanted to
call two medical witnesses, Dr. Jenkins and Dr. Alverez. Dr. Jenkins was
a well qualified medical specialist who was board certified by the
American Board of Internal Medicine. 115 Dr. Jenkins also had special
training and had taught in the fields of pulmonary disease, allergy, and
environmental medicine. He had seen Moore on three occasions, examined him, performed a variety of tests, and reviewed Moore's medical
records. His final conclusion was that Moore suffered from RADS and,
based upon his examination and tests, expressed the opinion that
Moore's RADS had been caused by the exposure to vapors from the
6
chemical spill at the Ashland facility in April of 1990. n Dr. Jenkins relied heavily on the MSDS in reaching this decision and conducted tests
to determine the close connection between Moore's exposure to the
Toluene solution and the symptoms which he exhibited after exposure to
7
the sp1'II age. n
110.
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Dr. Alverez was a former student of Dr. Jenkins and agreed with Dr.
Jenkins about the cause of Moore's RADS disease. He was Moore's primary treating physician and, in addition to the reasons relied on by Dr.
Jenkins, he supported his theory of causation with a report of a study on
RADS co-authored by Dr. Stewart Brooks that he found in a medical
magazine. 118 It is important to note that when Dr. Jenkins was initially
being deposed he stated that he did not know of any reported literature
that supported his causation opinion and that his knowledge of the medical report was made known to him outside the presence of the jury. 119
Perhaps the most important thing that Dr. Jenkins admitted at trial
was the fact that Moore was his first RADS patient who had had an exposure to Toluene and that he had never conducted any research on this
particular subject. Although Dr. Jenkins had previously treated other patients whose RADS he attributed to exposure to chemicals that he knew
were known to irritate the airways, he did concede that the chemicals involved with the previous patients were stronger and probably more irritating than those to which Bob Moore had been exposed. 120 The district
court reviewed Dr. Jenkins's deposition, listened to his testimony, and
decided to exclude his causation opinion. Although the court did permit
Dr. Jenkins to testify about his examination of Moore, the tests that he
had conducted as well as his diagnosis, the court excluded his opinion
because his exposure to the causation of RADS by Toluene in patients
121
like Bob Moore was limited.
The district court decided that Dr. Jenkins had no scientific basis for
this opinion and that it would be inconsistent with Rule 702 of the FRE,
not to mention the court's gatekeeper rule under Daubert, to admit this
particular opinion. 122 The court then allowed Dr. Alverez's scientific expert opinion even though it was essentially the same as Dr. Jenkins's because he had relied on the Brooks study and had also been Moore's treating physician throughout most of this particular time period. 123 Ashland's
chemical expert, Dr. Robert Jones, made his review from medical records and the overall medical history of Bob Moore and concluded that
he did not have RADS. He concluded that Moore suffered from a form of
bronchial asthma and that the Toluene did not cause his pulmonary problems. He believed that Bob Moore's history as a heavy smoker for about
twenty years, history as an asthmatic, and his bout with pneumonia al-
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lowed a trained physician to rule out RADS as a possible causation in.
Jury
tothe Iungs. 124
Given this background, the key issue here was the exclusion of Dr.
Jenkins's causation testimony and the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the
Supreme Court's resolution of the disagreement among circuit courts as
to the standard for admission of expert witnesses testimony or exclusion
thereof. The court concluded that Daubert was one of two cases that controlled the analysis in this situation. The Moore court analyzed the factors looked at by the Daubert Court including admissibility of witnesses,
the methodology used in the scientific community, the Frye doctrine, and
the issue that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede the admissibility
of scientific evidence as established in the Daubert case. Most importantly, the Fifth Circuit noted that although the Frye test was displaced
by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Rules did place some limits on
125
admissibility of scientific evidence. Scientific evidence must be relevant and reliable. It is the judge's responsibility to ensure that any and all
scientific evidence is admitted as long as the evidence is relevant and reliable.126
The most important thing that the Fifth Circuit did in Moore, 127 as
128
well as in Black, was to reiterate the essential element coming from the
Daubert case that the expert testimony of any scientific witness must be
buttressed by facts supporting the validity of that scientific evidence.
That is to say, the evidence must have been tested within the area and
realm within which that particular type of evidence would have been
tested. If the scientific evidence were legal we would look to legal scholars for legal documents, legal journal articles, and so on in order to bolster the argument that the conclusion reached by the author had substantial merit in the context of he or she being an expert. 129 In the case of
scientific or medical evidence, we would look toward articles resulting
from scientific studies and then published in a medical paper and subject
to the scrutiny of others in the field who could write contrary or concur.
. .
130
rmg opm10ns.
Remembering that the key question in this particular case was
whether Dr. Jenkins's opinion should be allowed in the court given that
he had not stated his knowledge of the Brooks report, but when it was
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called to his attention by counsel, he did claim to have knowledge of the
article and stated that he had relied on it. The Fifth Circuit considered the
issue regarding the admissibility of Dr. Jenkins's testimony in the light of
a Seventh Circuit decision in which the court stated, "[u]nder the regime
of Daubert a district judge asked to admit scientific evidence must determine whether the evidence is generally scientific, as distinct from being unscientific speculation offered by a genuine scientist." 131
The Fifth Circuit was establishing its preference that expert scientific
witnesses be able to substantiate their opinions with tests and factors that
meet the Daubert test. Simply stated, this means that without hard science or scientific studies that sometimes go beyond that offered by clinicians, this circuit is not inclined to accept the testimony of scientific expert witnesses absent unusual circumstances. 132 "In the end, Dr. Jenkins
is relegated to his fallback position that any irritant to the lungs could
cause RADS in a susceptible patient. Dr. Jenkins cited no scientific support for this theory." 133 Finally, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the "analytical gap"
between Dr. Jenkins's opinion regarding causation and his scientific
knowledge and data did not support the opinion which he proffered. The
quote authorized a conclusion under Rule 702 of the FRE that Dr. Jenkins's scientific knowledge would not assist the trier of fact in his role as
.
134
an expert witness. ·
IV. THE THIRD AND FOURTH CIRCUITS

In 1999, the Third and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal also decided
two cases dealing with the issue of expert testimony, but they adopted a
more flexible approach than that taken by the Fifth Circuit.
A. The Third Circuit and Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc.
In Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 135 the Third Circuit faced a situation where Carol Heller sued Shaw Industries, a carpet manufacturer, and
claimed that compounds from carpet had caused her to develop a respiratory illness. She had one of her experts, Dr. Joseph Papano, her treating
136
allergist, testify on her behalf. After an extensive hearing, the district
court excluded plaintiff's expert testimony and granted Shaw Industries'

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

/d. at 278 (quoting Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp .• 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996)).
See id.
/d. at 279.
See id.
167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999).
See id. at 149-50.
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motion for summary judgment. The appellate court revisited the case law
interpreting FRE 702, 401, and 403 and concluded that the district court
incorrectly excluded some aspects of the proper testimony, yet properly
excluded the central portions of the testimony that Heller would have
needed in order to prove her specified claim. 137 Most importantly, as to
the key issue in this particular article, the Third Circuit held that
the District Court was too restrictive in requiring Heller's medical expert to rely on public studies specifically linking Heller's illness with
Shaw's product, and in requiring Heller's medical expert to rule out all
alternative possible causes of her illness. However, it properly excluded
this expert's causation testimony because his conclusion regarding the
cause of Heller's illness was heavily based on a flawed temporal relationship between the installation of Shaw Carpet and the presence of
138
Heller's illness.

The court also properly excluded the testimony of Heller's environmental expert on the grounds that his environmental testing revealed levels of dangerous compounds in the air in Heller's home that were not
significantly higher than the background levels in his testing methodology.139 Therefore, the grant of summary judgment was affirmed because
the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the key elements with regard to Heller's experts' testimony necessary to prove causation.140
The key fact here is that the Third Circuit is in direct contradiction
with the Fifth Circuit by not agreeing that hard scientific data and studies
are required before a scientific expert witness' testimony will be accepted. The Third Circuit's test is more liberal and does not require a rote
141
acceptance of the factors set forth in the Daubert case.
On September 30, 1993, Carol Heller, her husband Thomas, and
their children moved into a nine-year-old home in Westchester, Pennsylvania. Not long after the move, Mr. Heller began experiencing allergy
symptoms, and a couple of months later he was advised to replace the
carpeting in the home because cat hair from the previous owner might

137. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 149-50.
138. /d.
139. See id. at 150.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 155. The court laced its opinion with comments such as the following:
Given the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the flexible nature of the
Daubert inquiry, and the proper roles of the judge and the jury in evaluating the ultimate
credibility of an expert's opinion, we do not believe that a medical expert must always
cite published studies on general causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular
object caused a particular illness.

/d.
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have caused this allergic reaction. 142 The new carpeting was installed in
mid-December by Shaw Industries in various rooms throughout the
house. In late December 1993, Carol Heller began to experience some
respiratory difficulties, which included asthma, breathing difficulties,
some wheezing, coughing, and dizziness. She sought treatment from her
father, a physician, and then consulted Dr. Joseph Papano, an allergist
and one of her two expert witnesses. 143 Dr. Papano conducted a full
medical history, did a number of allergy tests, including chest X-rays and
pulmonary function tests. 144 Based on these histories and tests, he ruled
out some of the possible causes of her respiratory difficulties. 145
In February 1994, she was still experiencing the problems but informed Dr. Papano that her symptoms improved when she was out of the
house. She also brought the doctor a sample of the Shaw carpet so he
could sample the odor for himself. 146 Dr. Papano recommended that she
contact Allen Todd of the Todd Environmental consultants company to
test the air quality in her home, as well as the carpet, and then to see him
again after she had the results. Todd tested the carpet twice. First, while
it was still in the house and the second time in May 1994 after the Hellers had moved out and all of the carpet was removed. At this point, levels of the toxic compound were found to be significantly lower, but none
of them was the type that would be expected to result in any type of asthmatic response. The Hellers returned to the house, and Mrs. Heller began
to experience her shortness of breath and irritating throat problems. In
November 1994, the Hellers sold the house for less than they had paid
for it and moved to another location. The Hellers filed suit in district
147
court.
The district court specially held a Daubert hearing over several days.
The key issue was whether or not the scientific evidence gathered on
both sides would be admissible at trial. 148 The court filed an unpublished
opinion granting defendants' motions for exclusion of the plaintiff's expert testimony and for summary judgment. 149 The Third Circuit ultimately concluded that during this process, some of the expert evidence
for Heller had been incorrectly excluded and should have been allowed
by the district court. This evidence would have weighed heavily on the
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causation issue, and the court spent extensive time discussing the issues
150
in Daubert as well as a number of other cases.
The Heller court was particularly taken with the Daubert Court's
comment that there was ample opportunity for vigorous crossexamination of any evidence that was presented at trial or a motion hearing, even evidence that the opposing side felt was admitted improperly .151 This approach or position would be in line with the Fourth Circuit's opinion that the Daubert factors were more flexible than viewed
by the Fifth Circuit in Black and Moore. 152 To state the Third Circuit's
opinion succinctly, the court noted, "[p]ut differently, an expert opinion
must be based on reliable methodology, must reliably flow from that
methodology and the facts at issue-but it need not be so persuasive as to
meet a party's burden of proof or even necessarily its burden of production."153
The Third Circuit stated that Heller had to demonstrate as a part of
the prima facie case that Shaw's carpet emitted toxic organic compounds
that, if inhaled, could cause the injury which she claimed. Certainly, the
testimony of Todd, a certified industrial hygienist, was integral to proving one or two of these elements and could bolster any medical conclusion of causation by demonstrating that the compound levels did exist in
the Heller home and were higher than usual. Without his testimony,
Heller would not be able to evoke any evidence that there had been organic compounds in the air at a sufficient level to cause her illness.
Without that particular evidence having been admitted first, in a subsequent trial, any effort to attempt to admit scientific expert evidence
154
would be meaningless. The court stated,
Dr. Papano testified that he also relied on temporal relationships between Heller's exposure to the Shaw carpet and onset of her symptoms
as well as information from Todd Environmental Consultants after its
testing of the Heller home in April and May 1994. Finally, Dr. Papano
relied on his more than thirty years of experience treating patients with
allergy related medical problems and his knowledge of environmental
causes of respiratory problems gained at professional seminars he attended.155
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Certainly, the lack of published research did not stand in the way of
the Circuit ruling that FRE 702 had been violated because it was not necessary that published clinical data and medical studies be presented to
156
support any testimony from a scientific witness. To quote the court:
A number of courts, including our own have looked favorably on medical testimony that relied heavily on a temporal relationship between an
illness and causal event. . . The temporal relationship will often be
(only) one factor, and how much weight it provides for the overall determination of whether an expert has 'good grounds' for his or her con157
clusion will differ depending upon the strength of that relationship.

The Third Circuit accepted a less stringent test for admission of scientific
data. 158
Ironically, the court agreed with the district court in the Heller case
that the evidence of Dr. Papano and Todd had been properly excluded
and that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment and
withholding the expert testimony. 159 Most importantly though, Heller
stands for the proposition that the Third Circuit placed itself in direct
contradiction with the Fifth Circuit with regard to what type of evidence
16
would be required in cases involving scientific expert testimony . ° Finally, it erased any questions as to the necessity for established studies
subject to clinical review and outside peer review before that evidence
would be admitted and any particular witness would be allowed to take
161
the stand at trial.
B. The Fourth Circuit's Holding in Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi A.B.

In Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi A.B., 162 Curtis and Connie Westberry brought an action against Gummi AB (GGAB) claiming that the
company was liable under South Carolina law for damages they had suffered as a result of the firm's failure to warn of the danger attendant to its
use of talcum powder on its rubber gaskets. 163 A jury verdict was reached
in federal court in favor of the Westberrys from which GGAB appealed.
Mrs. Westberry cross-appealed the refusal of the district court to increase

156. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 154.
I 57. /d. (citations omitted).
158. See id. at 154-55.
!59. See id. at 158-59, 164-65.
160. See id. at !55, 165.
161. See id. at 155-56. The court went to great lengths to reach this conclusion despite its conclusion that proffered expert's testimony had been properly excluded by the district court. /d.
162. Westberry, 178 F.3d at 257.
163. See id. at 259-60.
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damages. 164 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding. 165
GGAB is a manufacturing company that produces rubber products,
specifically rubber gaskets that are used in window frames. Westberry's
employer bought some gaskets produced by GGAB to be used in skylights and windows in a South Carolina plant where Westberry worked.
Because the rubber gaskets were difficult to handle, GGAB applied a
coating of talcum powder before they were shipped. 166 One of Westberry's first duties in the receiving plant was to remove the gaskets from
the boxes and place them in a cutting machine. In his testimony, he argued that there was a high concentration of airborne talc and that he did
not receive any warning regarding health dangers. Accordingly, he did
not wear any protective gear. 167 What followed was an unrelenting series
of sinus problems that resulted in numerous trips to the hospital and
treatment by his physician, Dr. W. David Isenhower, Jr. This also included some surgeries to alleviate his sinus pain. During these procedures his frontal sinuses were obliterated. 168 Westberry's claim against
GGAB is quite simple-its failure to warn of the dangers of the gaskets
coated with talcum powder proximately caused an aggravation of his
preexisting sinus condition for which aggravation GGAB was liable. 169
At trial, Westberry introduced his physician as an expert witness to
provide primary evidence of the causation issue. Obviously, the jury was
persuaded by Dr. Isenhower since it returned the verdict in Westberry's
favor. 170 The appeals court looked to FRE 702 regarding the strictures
that govern the entry of scientific evidence into a trial. 171 It cited Daubert
and made clear that it was necessary to demonstrate that the expert's
opinion was reliable and that it was supported by adequate validation in
order to render it trustworthy. The second part of the scientific evidence
test required an analysis of the opinion to insure that it was relevant with
regard to the facts at issue in the case. 172 As the court quoted the Kumho
Tire Co. case, "an expert's testimony is admissible under rule 702 if it
rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant." 173
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The appeals court noted the flexibility of the federal rules with regard to the admissibility of expert witness testimony and refused to find
that Dr. Isenhower's testimony should be inadmissible simply because it
was not based on "reliable scientific methodology." The mere fact that
Dr. Isenhower did not have any epidemiological studies or peer review
publications, where other laboratory data supported the conclusion regarding the inhalation of talcum powder causing Westberry's sinus problems, was not sufficient to bar his testimony. 174 GGAB argued that Dr.
Isenhower's testimony was nothing more than an opinion and certainly
not that of an expert. In the words of GGAB, Dr. Isenhower's diagnosis
was not reliable because he could not "rule in" talc as a possible cause of
sinus disease. There were no means of accurately assessing the level of
exposure, and this was absolutely essential in order to establish proximate cause. 175
The Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by GGAB 's arguments and
held that there was plenty of opportunity for any disagreement to be dealt
with on cross-examination. 176 The court believed that Dr. Isenhower had
demonstrated that he considered and excluded various potential causes
for Westberry's sinus disease and had ruled them in or out. 177 In this
fashion, he had reached his conclusion to which he testified at trial. Most
importantly, the court ruled that any alleged failure of an expert witness
to rule out all possible alternative causes is not sufficient to prohibit his
or her expert testimony at trial. In conclusion, the Richmond-based appellate court rejected GGAB' s arguments and held that "a reliable differential diagnosis provides a valid basis for an expert opinion on causation."178
V. THE UTAH EXPERIENCE
The issue of admissibility of scientific evidence and medical expert
testimony has received particularly acute attention recently in the State of
Utah by virtue of two decisions rendered by the State Supreme Court in
May 2000. 179 Just as the Daubert Court focused on the term "general acceptance" of scientific evidence and looked for reliability assessments
that would allow a differential diagnosis to be allowed or proffered to the

174. See Westberry, 178 F.3d at 261-63.
175. See id. at 263.
176. See id. at 264.
177. See id. at 264-65.
178. /d. at 265-66.
179. See State v. Kelley, I P.3d 546, 549 (Utah 2000); State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 642, 645 (Utah
2000). Both cases dealt with the admissibility of evidence offered by an expert relative to an individual's mental condition.
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trier of fact under rule FRE 702, the Utah justices were faced with a
comparable situation. Both of the cases that the court reviewed dealt with
convictions of individuals originally accused of sexually assaulting
women who were developmentally disabled.
A. State v. Adams
180

In State v. Adams,
Nealy W. Adams was convicted of forcible
sexual abuse, and his conviction was affirmed by the Utah Court of Ap181
peals as well as the State Supreme Court. Adams had developed a personal relationship with Ms. Virla Hess in 1993 and moved into her house
which she shared with her thirty-four-year-old daughter Carlene. The
daughter suffered from Down's Syndrome, could not read or write, and
had the cognitive skills level of a three-year-old. In 1994 Adams began
drinking excessively, and his relationship with Ms. Hess began to deteriorate. One evening, Ms. Hess awoke when she heard a very load sound
of breaking glass only to find Mr. Adams leaving Carlene's bedroom
wearing no clothes. When she spoke with Mr. Adams about the incident,
he said that he could not remember anything based on the fact that he had
been very intoxicated. At that point, both parties agreed that Adams
182
should leave the residence.
When Ms. Hess told Carlene that Adams was leaving the home, she
responded by telling her mother, "good, he has been messing with
183
me." Ms. Hess waited until Mr. Adams had removed all of his belongings from the home before she reported the sexual abuse to the police
and an intensive investigation began. Adams was subsequently charged
with one count of rape and another of forcible sexual abuse. At trial, Carlene testified that she had been molested by Adams even though opposing counsel attempted to suggest that the allegations had been invented
and that Carlene's story was coached in order to achieve retaliation for
184
what was effectively a lover's quarre1.
As part of its case, the State of Utah took testimony from Detective
DeHart who stated that he was "unable to lead Carlene with his questions
185
and that, in his opinion, she did not appear to be coached." He further
testified that the young woman's account of the molestation appeared to
be consistent with her subsequent description of the events, and he,
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therefore, had no reason to disbelieve the account. 186 The prosecution
also called Dr. Hawks, a psychologist, who had evaluated Carlene's general cognitive abilities and whose purpose was to testify that it was not
likely that Carlene could be coached in order to tell a trumped up story,
nor was she sophisticated enough to contrive it up on her own accord. 187
Based on the foregoing evidence, a jury acquitted Adams of rape but
found him guilty of forcible sexual abuse. 188 Adams appealed the jury result arguing that there had not been a proper foundation for Dr. Hawks's
testimony that Carlene was not capable of being coached. This argument
was summarily dismissed by the Utah Court of Appeals, but the court did
agree that Detective DeHart's testimony violated Rule 608(a) of the Utah
189
Rules of Evidence (URE). This rule deals with opinion testimony as to
character or truthfulness, and the appellate court held that admission was
really harmless error given the preponderance of other evidence to sup190
port the trial court's finding.
Most importantly, the court of appeals
ruled that Dr. Hawks's testimony satisfied the foundational requirements
191
for admitting scientific testimony established in State v. Rimmasch, a
base line precedent in Utah guiding the admissibility of such evidence.
Adams sought review of the court of appeals decision and certiorari was
192
granted.
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that Dr. Hawks's testimony did not
violate Rule 608(a) of the URE since the rule permits testimony dealing
193
with a witness' general character or reputation for truthfulness. It only
prohibits testimony as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion.194 As a result, the admissibility of Dr. Hawks's testimony had to
be reviewed with regard to whether Carlene could possibly have been
coached. The court found an answer to this question in the trial tran-

186. See id.
187. See Adams, 5 P.3d at 644.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 648. The court based its decision as to this expert's testimony on the fact that
"he did not offer a direct opinion of Carlene's truthfulness about the alleged sexual abuse." /d. at
646. The rationale for this conclusion emanated from the nature of his testimony. He testified as to
her lack of sophistication relative to the ability to be coached to tell a false story. See id. The court
also held Dr. Hawks's testimony properly admitted under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
but based upon a different rationale. Since the expert's testimony was not delving into "new or novel
scientific principles or techniques," the Rimmasch test did not apply. Accordingly, Rule 702 parameters were not violated. /d. at 646-47. As to Detective DeHart's testimony, there was ample "other
persuasive evidence" to support the conviction, making this harmless error. /d. at 647-48.
190. See id.
191. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989).
192. See Adams, 5 P.3d at 644.
193. See id. at 645-46.
194. See id.
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195
script.
The court reviewed the testimony and concluded that Dr.
Hawks's testimony did not violate rule 608(a) since it was merely his
opinion that she did not have the cognitive ability to be coached. This
196
was not a question of truthfulness.
Dr. Hawks had testified that it was
"probably not likely that the victim had been coached or that she was sophisticated enough to make such allegations at trial," 197 but the expert
witness did not offer any direct opinions regarding the victim's truthfulness about the alleged sexual abuse! 98 His comments were confined to
Carlene's mental capacity regarding the ability to effectively establish
and repeat a fabricated story! 99
This type of differential analysis was very much in concert with the
spirit of the Daubert case--despite the fact that the Utah Supreme Court
did not mention this-as URE 702 is virtually the mirror image of its
200
federal counterpart. Most importantly, the court held that Rule 608(a)
does not prevent an expert like Dr. Hawks from giving differential diagnosis in court from which a jury could infer the truthfulness of the witness.201 Instead, the rule bars direct testimony as to truthfulness. As aresult, Dr. Hawks did not improperly offer any evidence relative to
Carlene's veracity on any occasion, and his testimony did not violate the
202
appropriate Utah Rules of Evidence.
As to the foundation issue with regard to Dr. Hawks's testimony, the
court did not fall into the trap of requiring substantial scientific data and
published peer review documents in order to find probative or substantial
203
value in his differential diagnosis. The court found that he "properly
applied the scientific principles to the facts" and that "the probative value
204
of [his] testimony outweighed its potential for prejudice."
Consequently, although the Utah Supreme Court upheld the Utah Court of Appeals conclusion with regard to this issue, it did state that the lower ap205
pellate court's reliance on the Rimmasch case was misplaced.
The final inquiry relative to Dr. Hawks's testimony is the question of
admissibility relative to the general rule of expert testimony admission.
This is covered in URE 702 and provides that "if scientific, technical, or
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specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue, a witness qualifies as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in
206
the form of an opinion or otherwise." Since Dr. Hawks had specialized
knowledge that would provide assistance to the finder of fact, his opinion
207
was certainly relevant. Further, he was a designated mental retardation
expert with extensive experience with victims of alleged sexual abuse.
The trial court did not err with regard to allowing Dr. Hawks's testimony
relative to its overall discretion since Dr. Hawks's testimony was not
208
based on any new or novel theories.
B. State v. Kelley

In another Utah case factually similar to and decided just three days
prior to Adams, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of De209
fendant Allen Kelley for attempted rape. During trial, evidence was
introduced showing that the victim was staying with her brother over the
210
December 1997 Christmas holiday period. She was not capable of living alone and needed assistance even for the simplest of daily tasks. Defendant Kelley was staying with the victim's brother during the referenced December 1997 period, having moved there following marital
211
difficulties. On December 26, 1997, Kelley entered the victim's room,
undressed her, and attempted to initiate sexual intercourse with her. They
were interrupted by the victim's sister who entered the home to pick her
212
up according to a preestablished appointment. The sister found the vic213
tim naked from the waist down and the defendant ran out fully naked.
The sister helped dress the girl, removed her from the house, and called
214
the police.
At trial, Kelley was convicted and testified that he was
aware that the victim was "mentally retarded to some extent." 215
Four months prior to the trial, the government provided notice that
Ronald J. Wright, a mental retardation expert, would be called as a witness.216 Wright was also the director of the victim's residential home. 217
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Kelley's counsel failed to file a motion in limine or any other objection
challenging Wright's credentials or experience as an expert until four
days prior to the trial. 218 As the residential director of the victim's home,
his testimony was sought for no other significant purpose than to comment on her mental state. However, this catapulted him into the category
of an expert witness who could do considerable harm to the defendant's
case. At trial, oral argument was heard regarding the admissibility of
Wright's testimony. The judge ruled that if the prosecutor could lay a
proper foundation, the expert would be permitted to testify. 219 Wright testified that despite the fact the victim had the body of an adult, "she did
not have the mental capacity to consent to, or understand the conse. 11·tgence quotient
.
quences of , a sexual act. " 220 He use d mte
test scores,
mental age assessment, and his experience as a special education teacher
to reach his conclusion. 221 Kelley sought an appeal objecting to the admission of Wright's testimony 222 and to the ineffective assistance of
counsel due to the failure to file timely motions in his case. 223
Again, the key question was the admissibility of Wright's testimony
as an expert pursuant to URE 702. As noted by the Utah Supreme Court,
"[t]he critical factor in determining the competency of an expert is
whether that expert has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues before it." 224 The court focused on Wright's twentyseven years as a trained professional and his degree in special education
from Brigham Young University. 225 His experience was extensive in
working with other professionals in determining the intellectual capabilities of disabled individuals. 226 Not too surprisingly, the defendant objected to the fact that Wright was not licensed to diagnose mental retardation and alleged that this disqualified him from testifying as to the
victim's cognitive abilities. 227 Similar charges were levied against his

218. See Kelley, I P.3d at 548.
219. See id.
220. /d. at 549.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 549, 551-52. The Utah Supreme Court followed the precedent established by
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) that any ineffective assistance of counsel claim
must be buttressed by evidence in a demonstrable manner that his or her "performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonable judgment and, second. that counsel's performnnce prejudiced the
defendant." /d. (emphasis added); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994) (quoting Bundy
v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)). Since the evidence of Mr. Wright did not violate either
of these requirements, it was properly admitted. See Kelley, I P.3d at 552.
224. /d. at 549. See Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999).
225. See Kelley, I P.3d at 549.
226. See id. at 549-50.
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qualifications to administer an intelligence quotient (IQ) test. 228 The
court dispensed with these arguments in a fashion similar to that used in
the Adams case. 229 First, "licensing in and of itself is not dispositive of an
expert's qualifications to offer an opinion." 230 Secondly, "Wright's training and experience were sufficient for the trial court to have found him
qualified to give expert testimony on the victim's competency." 231 For
these reasons, URE 702 was not violated by the introduction of this expert's scientific and opinion testimony. 232
VI. CONCLUSION

The most recent contributions in this controversy are those made by
the Utah Supreme Court in Kelley and Adams. Not surprisingly, the Utah
Supreme Court chose to accept the prevalent view, as set forth in
Daubert, that flexibility and relevance supersede the strictures of the scientific community. This was done despite the fact that Daubert was not
cited or even mentioned in these state cases. In Kelley and Adams, deference was given to scientific methodology but not at the expense of robbing the trier of fact of reasonable, relevant, and potentially decisive evidence.
This is the prudent approach enunciated clearly in Daubert. The fact
that the Utah Supreme Court did not reference Daubert in its recent holdings may indicate the development of admissibility criteria that are, perhaps, even more forgiving than the Daubert criteria. The idea that the
trier of fact would be shielded from scientific evidence simply because it
is not vetted in a manner comparable to methodologies generally accepted in the legal community is not acceptable. A more flexible approach is necessary to maintain the good order of evidence introduction
and availability, especially in cases that rest on the opinion of differential
diagnoses offered by experienced physicians. As noted by one expert on
law and psychiatry, and as implied throughout the Utah opinions, experience does count for something. 233

228. See id.
229. See Kelley, I P.3d at 550-51.
230. /d. at 550. The court went on to state, "[w]e have routinely allowed persons to testify as
experts based on the totality of their qualifications and experience, and not on licensing or formal
standards alone." /d. (citations omitted).
231. !d.
232. See id.
233. See Bell, supra note 2, at A I 0. Professor Christopher Slobogin, a law professor with an
affiliation as a psychiatry professor with the University of Florida, stated: "Expertise is not only a
matter of degrees. It's a matter of experience and knowledge, ... " /d.

